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Employers and Employers Associations 
in the Netheriands Industrial 
Relations System 
John P. Windmuller 
This article analyzes the organization of employers in 
the Netheriands for their industrial relations tasks. After 
first describing the rôle of individual employers and 
explaining why that rôle is a relatively small one, the 
article emphasizes the structure and functioning of em-
ployers associations in industrial relations. Spécial atten-
tion is given to the existence of pluralistic associations in a 
country where hy tradition most if not ail social organiza-
tions are pluralistically organized. The postwar wage and 
économie policies of the Dutch government hâve encou-
ragea a high degree of centralized decision-making among 
employers as well as among labor organizations. The 
article coneludes with some observations about the likely 
conséquences of a current trend toward greater decentra-
lization. 
introduction 
In the Netheriands industrial relations System the employer side 
consists of associations and of individual firms, but the prime respon-
sibility for articulating employer I WINDMULLER, JOHN P_ B.A., (Illi- I 
interests belongs to the associa- I nois) ; Professor of Industrial and I 
tiens. Not ail enterprises are mem- Lab* Rations Cornell University ; 
, I Senior Fulbnght Research Scholar, I 
bers of an association, yet almost I Free University of Amsterdam, 1964- I 
ail the large ones are and so are | ^* | 
* This analysis of employers and employers associations in the Netheriands is part 
of a broader study of the Dutch industrial relations System. The author's stay in 
the Netheriands during the académie year 1964-65 to gather materials for his 
study was supported by a Fulbright research grant and by a supplemental grant 
from the Netheriands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research 
(Z.W.O.). 
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a good share of tbe medium-sized and smaller ones.y « Free riders » 
and high membersbip turnover rates hâve troubled most associations 
considerably less than they hâve the union. One of their major pro-
blems, instead, has been the maintenance of internai discipline and of 
uniform employer policies in labor relations — not an easy task even in 
« normal times », but an exceedingly difficult one in a compétitive labor 
market. 
Some forty years ago a staff member of an employers association 
observed how hard it was for an employer 
« . . . more or less to surrender his individuality with regard to the 
détermination of labor relations in his own enterprise and at the very 
least to consult with other members of his association about such 
matters. Anyone who can realize what a sacrifice this represents for 
an employer whose great strength rests precisely on his individuality 
can also understand the difficulties which beset the development of 
employer associations for industrial relations purposes. » 2 
Nevertheless, association authority, if not always association power, 
has gradually established itself over the whole field of industrial rela-
tions. Collective bargaining with labor organizations, propagation of 
employer views on national économie and social policies, relations with 
the relevant branches of government, and the broad field of public 
relations are principally the tasks of the associations. The number of 
firms preferring and able to play a really independent rôle in industrial 
relations is relatively small. Except for the very largest ones among 
them, thèse firms are independent more in the sensé that they administer 
their own personnel policies and programs without much association 
assistance rather than in the more fundamental sensé of following 
unique and différent labor policies. 
Several reasons account for the prominence of associations in indus-
trial relations. Many associations were founded before or shortly after 
World War I, especially in industries, or in régions, where unions had 
conducted successful organizing drives and were demanding récognition 
and collective agreements. Some also emerged as a défensive reaction 
(1) J. E. ANDRIESSEN, S. MIEDEMA and C. T. OORT, De sociaal-economisch besturing 
van Nederland, 2d éd., (Groningen : Noordhoff, 1964), p. 68. 
(2) B. BÔLGER, « De werkgeversorganisatie in Nederland », De Economist, Vol. 77, 
(1927), p. 221. 
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to the revolutionary rhetoric of thé November days of 1918. The rela-
tively modest size of most business establishments compelled employers 
to recognize early that effective action on their own behalf, whether 
for the purpose of suppressing unions or — later — of negotiating 
with them, required counter-organizations. In times of struggle, the 
reliance on joint défense funds and area-wide lockouts, even though 
they circumscribed the freedom of action of the individual enterprise, 
soon proved superior to individual résistance.3 Also around the rime 
of World War I the beginnings of governmental social policies and of 
labor législation required the présence of authoritative spokesmen for 
employer interests before the législature and the political parties so 
as to offset the pressure from organized labor. Durable employers 
associations seemed best suited for the job of fashioning a single 
employer viewpoint out of many diverse ones and of presenting ît 
effectively to a society whose deserved réputation for its generous 
tolérance of widely varying political and social philosophies nevertheless 
rested on a hard base of conservatism and attachment to tradition. 
To thèse two original reasons — collective security and the need 
for astute pressure group représentation — a third one soon joined itself 
whose importance increased in proportion to the growth of unions and 
of législation, namely the demand by employers for services and tech-
nical assistance. The failure of associations to stem the growth of 
union power raised the incidence and importance of collective bargain-
ing négociations and contract administration in the 1920's, while the 
passage of protective labor laws called for expertise in applying the 
new légal norms. Most employers had neither the économie strength 
nor the managerial skills nor, one might say, the psychological equip-
ment to cope by themselves — and simultaneously — with the unions 
and government apparatus. Since management consulting firms were 
hardly on the scène before World War II, most companies expected 
their associations to supply them with a variety of advisory and operating 
services in industrial relations, including not only contract negotiations 
and administration but also advice on personnel policies. Sometimes 
the associations also took on a quasi-mediating rôle in contract inter-
prétation disputes between an individual enterprise and the unions 
represented among its employées, especially in view of the fréquent 
(3) See H. HOEFNAGELS, Een eeuxo sociale problematiek (Assen : van Gorçum, 
1957), p. 122. 
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absence of formai grievance procédures.4 Over the years, the individual 
enterprise thus became increasingly dépendent on its association for 
bargaining strength, représentation, and services, while the latter became 
correspondingly more indispensable to its clients. After 1945, the 
introduction of standardized job évaluation Systems on a national 
and industry-wide basis further increased employer dependence on 
assistance from associations.5 To complète the circle, the availability 
of association services tended to delay the establishment of industrial 
relations departments in medium-sized and smaller companies, while 
simultaneously the lack of demand for industrial relations specialists 
obviated the need for institutionalized professional training. It was 
therefore not until the 1950's and 1960's that académie programs to 
train industrial relations practitioners were introduced into the educa-
tional system and that the associations themselves developed training 
programs for the personnel staffs of their member firms. 
A final reason for the ascendancy of the associations ensued after 
World War II from the prevalence of national économie controls and 
the centralization of decision-making. Thèse measures superimposed 
on the long-standing responsibility of the associations for supervising 
privately negotiated bargains an added responsibility of ensuring the 
adhérence of individual companies to the quasi-public terms of employ-
ment embodied in national central agreements. It was a task which 
the associations did not take on with alacrity since it could and did 
lead to conflicts with some of their own members, but a task which 
nevertheless enhanced both their power and their authority in industrial 
relations. 
Individual Employers 
The division of labor between associations and individual enterprises 
in the field of industrial relations has customarily allocated to the asso-
ciations the task of collective dealings with unions and government 
(4 ) « Quite generally much emphasis is placed on the rôle of the shipping asso-
ciations in handling the complaints of union members. If an individual employer 
appears unwilling to résolve the problems in direct contacts with the union, the 
intervention of the shipping association is certainly expected to clear mp the diffi-
culty. Calling upon this kind of intermediary apparently reduces the direct confront-
ation of interests, so that a satisfactory outeome is more readily reached. » PJ .A. 
T E R HOEVEN, Havenarbeiders van Amsterdam en Rotterdam ( Leiden : Stenfert 
Kroese, 1963), p . 300. 
(5 ) See MARTIN P. OETTINGER, « Nationwide Job Evaluation in the Netherlands », 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 4, No. 1 (October 1964), pp. 45-59. 
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and to the individual company a primary responsibility for personnel 
policies. In most companies, union relations as such are non-existent 
or at best indirect, for the union's rightful place in the Netherlands as 
in several other continental European countries is traditionally not 
inside the plant but beyond the gâtes. Most companies, however, do 
operate under the terms of collective agreements negotiated on their 
behalf by an association. The faithful administration of thèse agree-
ments is, to be sure, an obligation which inheres in association member-
ship, but should disagreements arise with employées or their représen-
tatives over the meaning and application of contract terms, the company 
concerned will as a rule soon bring the association into the dispute as 
its guide and agent. 
There are, of course, exceptions to thèse arrangements. Some 
companies insist on handling their own relations with unions, including 
the negotiation of single-enterprise agreements. Others welcome 
assistance from their association, but only after having made genuine 
efforts to settle problems through direct discussions with employée 
spokesmen and outside union représentative. Several important com-
panies hâve on their own initiative developed highly progressive 
personnel policies and elaborate social benefit and welfare programs. 
The very largest ones, like Philips and Hoogovens, not only negotiate 
their own collective agreements but sometimes act as pace setters in 
the resolution of important issues, such as the conclusion of long-term 
agreements and the equalization of the terms of employment for white-
collar and blue-collar employées. But many, if not most, companies 
still fit into the more gênerai pattern of depending heavily on associ-
ations in their industrial relations, especially if they are family-owned 
companies with a tradition-bound relationship to their employées. 
An experienced management consultant has given a vivid descrip-
tion of the climate that still prevails in a number of family-owned and 
family-run enterprises: 
« In the smaller localities especially, the personnel adhères to a 
traditional spirit of obédience with extends to their private lives. It 
is expected that the owner's family show an interest in family events 
such as births and weddings . . . Within the plant, thèse relationships 
lead to a certain familiarity. Employées like being addressed by top 
management in the local dialect. Obédience is considered a matter 
of course. Orders are followed without contradiction but also without 
much thinking. Attempts to change accustomed ways of doing things 
cause much distrust and may run into çonçealed résistance, Outsiders 
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in the plant are viewed as « strangers ». Supervisors and managers 
brought in from other areas o£ the country are not readily trusted. 
When personal problems arise the préférence is for going to the 
owner's family. » 6 
Just how many companies fit into this pattern — and even more 
importantly, how many employées work under it — is difficult to say. 
The admittedly outdated « census of manufacturer » of 1950, which 
was limited to manufacturing, commerce, and transportation, showed 
that only 2.7 percent of ail establishments were corporations, ail the rest 
being single-owner firms, partnerships, joint stock companies, coopéra-
tives, and others. Furthermore, a sizable proportion of the corporations 
were actually family corporations under closely held control. However, 
the proportion of employées employed by ail corporations (open and 
family) was a much larger 38.2 percent.7 
It is relevant in this connection to draw attention not only to the 
structure of ownership but also to the distribution of enterprises accord-
ing to the number of their employées. (See Table 1.) 
TABLE 1 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES 
BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYÉES 
Smatt Enterprises Medium-Sized Enterprises Large Enterprises 
(10-49 Employées) (50-499 Employées) (500 and More) 
Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of Percent of 
Enterpr. Employées Enterpr, Employées Enterpr. Employées 
Mid-1953 69 16 28 39 3 45 
End of 1964 67 14 30 35 3 51 
Source : Maandstatistiek van de Industrie, February 1966, p. 109. 
Although the trend toward greater concentration of employment in 
large enterprises émerges clearly from the last column in Table 1, it is 
equally apparent that about half of the approximately 1,200,000 em-
ployées in manufacturing still worked in 1964 in small and medium-sized 
(6) D. HORRTNGA, Leiderschap en organisatie in de Nederlandse onderneming, 
2nd éd. (Assen : van Gorcum, 1961), pp. 57-58. 
(7) For further détails see ANDRIESSEN, MIEDEMA and OORT, op. cit., pp. 22 ff. 
Data based on the 1960 census were not yet available at the rime this was being 
written. 
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establishments of which almost ail could safely be assumed to be family 
ventures. Given the probable relationship between size of enterprise 
and receptivity to progressive management practices, it is hardly sur-
prising that many companies hâve not yet heeded the leadership of 
some of the larger enterprises — and the educational programs of 
employers associations — in transforming the traditional and often 
paternalistic relationship with their employées into one based on greater 
equality through collective dealings. Most employers will not yet tolerate 
a formai union présence in their plants. Frequently, therefore, it is the 
works council, by law always chaired by the employer or his représen-
tative, which acts as the principal channel for the expression of 
employée wishes. Under thèse circumstances, labor-management con-
flicts are likely to produce at times a strong emotional reaction on the 
part of the employer, especially in those rare cases when they develop 
into strikes. For from many an employées point of view an open 
conflict signifies more an act of rébellion than a business-like struggle 
for économie or other benefits. 
Continuity of family ownership explains why the préservation of 
an intégral employer class, or estate, still appears désirable to the 
oligarchy of trade and commerce which has for centuries constituted a 
topmost layer of Dutch society. No doubt gifted individuals find it 
increasingly easier to break through the barriers, certainly more so in 
mid-twentieth century than ever before, but the transition to a more 
open System is still under way, and neither technical compétence nor 
the amassing of wealth constitutes as yet a sure guarantee of eventual 
acceptance. When circumstances require a family to bring a profes-
sional manager into the company, perhaps because there are no maie 
members to assume the top position or because the younger génération 
has proven unable to préserve the company's compétitive existence, his 
acceptance in some of the more conservative areas of the country may 
remain incomplète. As an « upstart » he is not quite the equal of the 
genuine owner-managers in nearby companies. Workers will probably 
take him less seriously as they discover that his décisions as an outsider 
are subject to overriding counter-orders by the family.8 
The ablest student of the social origins and position of Dutch em-
ployers has concluded that upward social mobility is difficult enough 
to begin with, but that « the climb from the two lowest layers [of the 
social structure] into an executive position or seat on the board is a 
(8) HORRINGA, op. cit., pp. 61-62. 
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great exception. » 9 The particular légal form of ownership does not 
make much différence in this respect. Corporations can be just as 
tightly closed as partnerships or single-owner firms, as shown for exam-
ple by multiple tenure of seats on corporation boards (raden van 
commissarisseri). Seventy percent of ail incumbents hold membership 
on more than one board and almost 25 percent occupy more than five 
seats.10 There is also an excellent chance, almost one out of two, that 
in any given corporation the top executives will be relatives of one 
another. 
A vested tradition of secrecy about company affairs, still justified 
by référence to the exigencies of foreign and domestic compétition, has 
long enjoyed légal support. The principal beneficiaries of the tolérance 
of secrecy are the so-called « closed » corporations, generally distin-
guishable from the « open » ones by the fact that their shares tend to be 
kept within the family and are thus not traded in the securities markets. 
However, even the open or « public » corporations reveal far less about 
their activities and their financial performance than U.S. corporations 
are by law compelled to do. 
The origins of secrecy in business affairs are undoubtedly closely 
related to the 16th and 17th century origins of secrecy in public affairs, 
even if spécial factors (tax avoidance, compétition, fear of envy) hâve 
served in a contributory rôle. Thèse origins should be sought in the 
business world's counterpart of the « régents' mentality » (regenten-
mentaliteit) which still accounts for the notion prévalent among some 
high government officiais that authority carries its own legitimacy 
within i t . i r The « régents' mentality » in government, as Prof essor 
Daalder has indicated, had three major effects on the top strata, ail 
increasing the gap between the citizen and his government: a) the 
tendency toward arrogant rejection of criticism, b) the tendency toward 
secrecy, and c) the tendency toward an inflated sensé of self-impor-
(9) P. VINKE, De maatschappelijke plaats en herkomst der directeuren en com-
missarissen van de open en daarmede vergelijkbare besloten naamhze vennootschap-
pen (Leiden : Stenfert Kroese, 1961), p. 240. Vinke's study is ail the more remark-
able because of the scarcity of published data and the gênerai unwiïlingness of 
employers en employers associations to make information available. 
(10) ANDRIESSEN, MIEDEMA and OORT, op. cit., p. 32. 
(11) For this idea I am indebted to Prof essor Hans Daalder, especially to his 
inaugural lecture as a professor at Leiden University, published under the title 
Leiding en lijdelijkheid in de Nederlandse politiek (Assen : van Gorcum, 1964). 
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tance.12 In much the same way the attitude of the entrepreneurial 
oligarchy had parallel conséquences for the spirit in which business 
affairs hâve customarily been conducted, notably the tendency to main-
tain strict secrecy and the tendency to safeguard control over company 
affairs against ail interlopers, whether they be unions, works councils, 
stockholders, or administrative agencies of government.13 
In récent years, criticism of business secrecy and tightly held 
ownership controls hâve gathered force. As one would hâve expected, 
the absence of reliable and documented business information had for 
a very long time already fostered suspicion, gossip, spéculation, and 
jealousy, but in the last décade increasingly hard questions hâve been 
raised about the fairness with which the proceeds of the enterprise are 
being distributed among the several catégories (owners, managers, 
stockholders, employées) dépendent on it. To thèse questions hâve of 
course been joined perennial but now somewhat more pronounced and 
explicit efforts of employée and stockholder groups to widen their 
comparatively negligible rôle in shaping company policies.14 As a 
conséquence, and with the active encouragement of influential university 
professors, a major debate about the place and responsibility of the 
enterprise in contemporary society has gotten under way, paralleling 
similar debates in other European countries, notably in France.15 
Proposais for reform now on the table include limits on the number 
of directors' seats which a single person may legitimately hold, ceilings 
on the share of earnings or profits which corporations may distribute 
as bonuses and fées to their directors and executives, désignation of a 
spécial spokesman for employée interests on boards of directors, in-
(12) Ibid., p. 13. 
(13) That secrecy is not limited to only government and business organizations 
émerges clearly from the following sentence which appeared in an editorial note 
of a sociological journal a propos research in political sociology : « It is perhaps 
a rather typical Dutch characteristic that the results of scientific research conducted 
by, or by means of, certain institutions are often surrounded by great secrecy and 
are sometimes not even available in any form whatsoever to professional colleagues 
[ in the académie world ] ». J.E. ELLEMERS, in Sociologische Gids, Vol. 10, No. 5 
(September-October 1963), p. 225. 
( 14 ) W.F. DE GAAY FORTMAN, « Herziening van het recht betreffende de naamloze 
vennootschap », reprinted from Album Prof essor Fernand van Goethem (Leuven, 
1961), p. 471. 
(15) See FRANÇOIS BLOCH-LATNÉ, Pour une réforme de Ventreprise (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1963) for a critique of the modem corporation. For a défense 
see PIERRE DE CALAN, Renaissance des libertés économiques et sociales (Paris : 
Pion, 1963). 
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creasing the effectiveness of works councils (for example by providing 
them with the same information about company affairs that is given 
to boards of directes), requiring publication of more informative annual 
reports, creating a public supervisory board analogous to the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and further extending the stock-
holders' presently limited right to demand an investigation of a corpo-
ration^ affairs.16 So far, none of the proposais has been enacted into 
law. Most employers' groups hâve expressed opposition to most of 
the reforms.17 If the history of social and économie reform in the 
Netherlands may serve as a gênerai guide, it is likely that after extended 
debate in many différent forums there will eventually émerge a con-
sensus suitable as the basis for moderate reforms. That process, 
however, will most probably take several more years before beginning 
to produce tangible results. 
Employers Associations : The Central Fédération 
For historical reasons, a cardinal feature of Dutch society is the 
prevalence of blocs or groups based on religious and ideological-philo-
sophical affiliation. Thèse are the Catholic, the Protestant (Calvinist), 
and the « gênerai » or non-denominational zuilen — literally meaning 
pillars or columns, but more properly viewed as the constituent groups 
of society. The « gênerai » group is sharply subdivided into Socialist 
and Libéral parts. Because this division extends into virtually ail or-
ganized activities, from political parties to athletics and from éducation 
to the mass communications média, pluralism is also an intégral feature 
of Dutch labor-management relations. 
Although vertical segmentation has not gone quite as far among 
employers as it has among workers, still, ever since the turn of the 
century a substantial number of them hâve felt sufficiently strongly 
about their dual identity as employers and Protestants, or employers 
and Catholics, to join and maintain associations representing them m 
(16) Most of thèse points hâve been discussed and shaped into spécifie législative 
proposais in the report of the influential, spécial commission appointed by the 
Minister of Justice in 1960, the so-called Verdam commission. Its report, entitled 
Herziening van het ondernemingsrecht (The Hague : Staatsuitgeverij, 1965), is 
currently a subject of discussion in various forums. 
(17) For the views of an influential segment among employers toward the reform 
proposais and for an exposition of changes that would be acceptable see Open onder-
nemerschap : de groei van de onderneming en het vennootschapsrecht, 2nd édition 
(The Hague, Nijhoff, 1962). 
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both capacities. Mille dealers, therefore, to single out only one group, 
hâve their choice of joining a non-confessional, Protestant, or Catholic 
mille dealers* association, as of course do employers in many other 
économie sectors. On the other hand, there are also trades and branches 
in which a single association represents the collective interests of ail 
proprietors and managers without differentiation according to belief. 
The threefold division émerges more clearly at the next higher 
level, the level at which the individual industry or trade associations 
unité into central fédérations. In each économie sector where central 
fédérations hâve been formed — namely industry or big business, agri-
culture, and small business — there exist « gênerai », Catholic, and 
Protestant central organizations of employers associations. Thus, three 
fédérations represent the spécial interests of farmers and related em-
ployers: a non-confessional organization representing about 60,000 
members, a Catholic organization with about 75,000 members, and a 
Protestant organization counting close to 30,000 members.18 Together, 
thèse three fédérations represent about 80 percent of ail farm proprietors. 
They maintain close relations with one another, and each one also acts 
as a generally successful pressure group within that political party (or 
those parties) corresponding most nearly to the ideological-religious 
convictions of the organization's membership. 
The second set of central fédérations are the organizations dedicated 
to the interests of small business. They represent enterprises in whole-
sale and retail trade, repair and other services, independent businessmen-
artisans, small transport firais, and small manufacturing outfits. The 
three most important ones are again a gênerai, a Catholic, and a Pro-
testant organization.lô Through a Consultative Committee they seek 
to coordinate their policies so as to présent a common front vis-à-vis 
other économie interests. However, the cohesiveness of small business-
men is not as strong as that of farmers or industrialists — a short-coming 
which is reflected in the proportion of organized small business firms. 
(18) The membership figures are derived from Overzicht van vrife ondernemers-
organisaties in Nederland, 3rd éd., (The Hague : Sociaal Economische Raad, i960), 
pp. 14-16. They date from the late 1950's and may meanwhile hâve gone down 
somewhat because agriculture is a declining économie sector. 
(19) The gênerai organization claimed 41,000 members in trade associations and 
14,000 in régional groups in about 1960. The Catholic organization listed a total 
of about 56,000 members. The Protestant organization claimed 22,000 members 
in trade associations and 8,000 in régional groups. The figures for the gênerai and 
the Protestant fédérations include a certain amount of double counting. Ihid., 
pp. 16-18. 
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It has been estimated that this amounts to only about 35 or 40 percent, 
thus considerably less than in the case of agriculture and big business.20 
Relations between the central fédérations for small business and the 
political parties closely resemble the relations maintained by the agricul-
tural organizations. As recognized interest groups they are allowed to 
claim a share of the relevant parties' seats in Parliament and some 
représentation on party executive organs. From thèse vantage points 
they maintain a watchful attitude over the social-economic policies 
of the government and the political parties to make sure that the 
welfare-state philosophy does not displace completely the more tradi-
tional values of thrift, freedom, and private enterprise. 
At the very center of the complex network of employers associations 
stand the central fédérations for big business and industry. That there 
are four instead of the customary three fédérations should not be 
considered a radical departure from the symmetrical pattern of associa-
tion structure because two of the four fédérations are in essence sister 
organizations. They fill différent functions but their gênerai outlook 
coincides and their clientèle is an overlapping one. Thèse two associa-
tions, both of them gênerai or non-confessional in character, are the 
Fédération of Netherlands Industries (V.N.W.) and the Central Social 
Fédération of Employers (C.S.W.V.). The other two organizations are 
confessional in nature: the Netherlands Catholic Employers Fédération 
and the Fédération of Protestant Employers. Together thèse four 
associations occupy the « commanding heights » of the Dutch economy 
— manufacturing, the extractive industries, export-import trading, 
transportation, communications, banking, and insurance. To ensure 
continuing close contacts among themselves the central fédérations for 
industry and big business hâve formed a strong coordinating organ 
which brings their executive boards and secrétariats together in regular 
monthly meetings to set common policies on issues of common 
concern.21 
(20) This estimate also includes the members of a fourth central fédération for 
small business, the Nederlands Verbond van Middenstandsverenigingen, a small non-
confessional organization which distinguishes itself from the larger non-confessional 
group by the fact that politically it stands farther to the Left. The fourth fédération 
is an « outsider » ; it does not usually participate in the joint consultation scheme 
of the other three, nor is it représentée! in bipartite and triparite institutions. 
(21) Indicative of issues of common concern to the four central fédérations are 
the standing and ad hoc committees functioning under the auspices of the Council. 
In 1963 thèse included committees on cartels, energv and power, taxes, relations 
between industry and higher éducation, international problems (jointly with the 
labor organizations ! ), European intégration, exports, foreign migrant labor, product 
Iabelling, relations between the législature and industry, principles of wage policy, 
long-term planning and several others. 
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Although it is a very large organization, the V.N.W. is of least 
relevance to this account because its chief purpose is the représentation 
of the so-called « économie » interests of its members rather than their 
social or labor relations interest. The term « économie » in this context 
refers to a distinction which European employers hâve traditionally 
tried to draw, and to défend, between two sets of interests and activities: 
the économie and the social ones. The économie side has been held 
to contain such important catégories as tax policy, cartel policy, foreign 
trade, production problems, régional development, and many related 
matters. The social side, by contrast, is said to encompass at its core 
such items as labor relations, labor législation, personnel policy, the 
labor market, and social and welfare policy. The point of the distinction, 
arbitrary and artificial as it may now appear, is that when Dutch em-
ployers first expressed a willingness to share some decision-making with 
unions they strictly limited it to the so-called area of social affairs while 
firmly resisting bilatéral arrangements of any kind in the so-called 
économie area. In a simplified sensé one may say that they were 
willing to talk wages but not priées, costs, and profits. In view of this 
position, the non-confesionally organized employers at an early stage 
decided that the already existing V.N.W. was not a proper body for 
confronting the unions and that a separate organization would hâve 
to be set up through which employers could consult with one another 
about their industrial relations problems and policies. That organization 
became the forerunner of the présent C.S.W.V.22 
The total number of C.S.W.V. members, whether represented 
through one of its 50-odd constituent industrial and régional associations 
or through direct affiliation, amounts to about 12,000. It is therefore 
the largest and in many respects the most important central employers 
fédération in the Netherlands.23 
(22) The C.S.W.V. came into existence in August 1945 as the successor to the 
Centraal Overleg in Arbeidszaken voor Werkgeversbonden which had functioned 
from 1920 on as the labor relations and social policy arm of the libéral employers. 
See p. II-7 above. Cf. 10 jaar C.S.W.V. (The Hague, Centraal Sociaal Werkgevers-
verbond, 1954), pp. 5-6, and in the same volume the article by D. U. Stikker 
« Hoe het C.S.W.V. tôt stand kwam », pp. 8-12. 
(23) There now is an excellent chance that the two big non-confessional fédéra-
tions will merge into a single organization. A joint commission to investigate the 
procédural and substantive problems of fusion was appointed in 1965. It made a 
favorable intérim report to membership meetings of both fédérations in 1966. The 
reaction of the membership, in turn, was sufficiently encouraging to stimulate 
further work on the merger plans. Consummation may be expected sometime in 
1967, or in any event in the late 1960's. When it cornes, an important traditional 
distinction in the non-confessional employer camp will hâve disappeared in fonn 
as well as in fact. 
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The Catholic fédération for mdustry and big business consists of 
some 60 trade or industrial associations most of which, but not ail, are 
themselves Catholic organizations. The point hère is that trade and 
industry associations with a mixed ideological-religious membership 
hâve increasingly sought simultaneous affiliation with the non-confes-
sional and confessional central fédérations, usually on a pro-rata basis, 
so as to satisfy the interests and consciences of ail their members. The 
total number of enterprises represented indirectly and directly in the 
N.K.W.V. amounts to perhaps 4,000. Most of them, needless to say, 
operate in the predominantly Catholic southern provinces. 
The smallest of the central fédérations for industry is the Protestant 
fédération. Its membership consist of some 45 to 50 trade and mdustry 
associations (some affiliated for reasons already mentioned only with a 
portion of their membership) and about 650 individual firms. Its 
limited resources and its relatively small staff, especially by comparison 
with the C.S.W.V., place it under a considérable handicap in keeping 
up with the others. To be sure, its continued existence is not in any 
danger as long as its présence on the employer side is required by the 
symmetry of the threefold nature of représentation and as long as enough 
firms and trade groups are willing to maintain a dual affiliation, but 
its ability to function effectively as a service-rendering organization is 
relatively modest. For that reason, it has shown itself eager to strive 
for steadily closer « federative collaboration » with its Catholic coun-
terpart. 
The relative dimensions of the central fédérations for industry and 
big business cannot be indicated with the same précision wliich pu-
blished membership statistics make possible for trade unions. In an 
unpublished report the government has estimated that « about 80 percent 
of employers in industry belong to the libéral non-denominational 
organization, the Central Social Employers' Association (C.S.W.V.) ».24 
This informed appraisal, perhaps slightly too high, corresponds to most 
other estimâtes. The Catholic fédération probably accounts for approxi-
mately 15 percent and the Protestant fédération for the remaining five 
percent. 
Such a distribution would, on the face of it, seem to confer on the 
C.S.W.V. an overwhelmingly strong position among the central em-
(24) See Growth and Economie Policy (Paris: Organization for Economie Co-
opération and Development, c. 1964), mimeographed, p. 174. 
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ployers fédérations. Yet, the arithmetic may be deceptive. In the first 
place, the employers fédérations do not arrive at their décisions through 
a process of weighted voting but rather through discussions, negotiations, 
and compromises. In this process the C.S.W.V. can, of course, bring 
into play its superior numbers, staff work, and financing, but thèse are 
not always décisive. The confessional organizations benefit considerably 
from the relatively close ties which exist between their leaders and the 
right wings of the corresponding religious political parties. While some 
leading C.S.W.V. members, too, main tain personal relations with a 
political party, namely the Libéral party, a crucial différence is that the 
Libéral party may or may not be in the government at any given time, 
whereas without at least one of the confessional parties a government 
cannot even be formed. Furthennore, there are présent in the two 
confessional fédérations, and especially in the Protestant one, a few 
leading employers possessed of considérable personal stature and a 
corresponding amount of influence, thereby reinforcing the position of 
the confessional organizations. 
To sum up the balance of forces, the C.S.W.V. is without question 
the most powerful of the industrial central employers fédérations, but 
it cannot and probably does not even wish to make its own views prevail 
without close consultation with the other fédérations. 
The internai structure of the central employers fédérations bears 
a certain resemblance to the structure of trade union fédérations, 
although in neither case should the hierarchy of échelons be confused 
with the locus of real decision-making. As a rule, the fédérations hold 
two gênerai membership meetings per year. One of thèse is closed and 
deals at least in part with internai matters, especially financing, admi-
nistration, and gênerai policy. The second is open and therefore more 
informational, educational, and public relations in purpose than admi-
nistrative and goveramental. 
Far more important as a policy-making organ than the semi-annual 
membership meeting is the so-called gênerai committee on which the 
principal affiliated industry associations and, in one way or another, 
the very large companies occupy one or more seats.25 General com-
(25) In the C.S.W.V. and possibly also in the other central fédérations, the staffs 
and officers of affiliated associations which are not officially represented on the 
gênerai committee may nevertheless attend its meetings. See C.S.W.V., Jaarverslaa, 
1964, pp. 21-22. 
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mittees meet about every other month and deal chiefly with issues of 
national économie and social policy. Although in a formai sensé they 
are the decision-making body, their principal rôle, it would appear, is 
to serve as a forum for a relatively open expression of diverse employer 
views on the basis of which the officers and staffs of the fédérations 
can then formulate their actual policy lines with regard to spécifie issues 
and developments. 
A small executive board comprising from 14 members in the 
C.S.W.V. to 7 in the Protestant fédération exercises close supervision 
over day-to-day fédération affairs. Because of their distinguished mem-
bership, drawn from the top managerial strata of the large enterprises, 
the executive boards command not only wide respect but are in effect 
the actual center of power. Through monthly meetings they keep a 
close check on current developments in industrial relations and on the 
work of spécial fédération committees functioning under board auspices. 
The boards also supervise the secrétariats headed by one or several 
gênerai secretaries.26 
An important distinction must be drawn between central employers 
fédérations and trade union fédérations conceming the authority of 
their full-time officiais. In the latter, full-time officers are simulta-
neously elected policy-makers, public spokesmen, and top administrators. 
In employers associations, however, the highest full-time staff officiais 
hold their jobs by appointaient and, at least in theory, wield no personal 
power in their own right. They are employées who perforai a necessary 
and highly responsable task, but they are not — at least not in a formai 
sensé — policy makers. The policy-making function résides in the 
boards and more broadly in the gênerai committees, therefore in men 
who by virtue of business ownership and top management positions 
pursue their primary activities outside their associations. It is, of 
course, in the nature of things that secretaries and gênerai secretaries 
exercise a considérable amount of influence in the fédérations, but they 
make it a practice to remain behind the scènes as much as possible and 
to let the présidents and board members reap the prestige which accrues 
from fréquent public appearances as spokesmen for respected interest 
groups. 
(26) For a brief discussion of the internai government of the employers fédéra-
tions, see ANDRIESSEN, MIEDEMA and OORT, op. cit., p. 70. 
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The fédérations do not publish or otherwise make available financial 
reports except for a bland summary of assets and liabilities. Their 
incomes are derived from dues levied on the payrolls of their members. 
Most of their operating expenses unquestionably go into personal ser-
vices, publications, meetings, educational programs, travel, and similar 
operating items, but the size of their budgets can only be guessed at. 
For the C.S.W.V., this is likely to be in the neighborhood of FI. 1,500,000 
($400,000) per year. The C.S.W.V. employs some 25 professional staff 
members, the Catholic organization about 15, and the Protestant one 
less than 10.27 They include specialists in various fields of industrial 
relations whose work brings them in constant touch with govemment 
agencies, trade union fédérations, individual firms requiring service as-
sistance, and of course also the staffs of industry and trade associa-
tions. 28 
In the postwar period the central fédérations hâve constituted an 
important réservoir for filling cabinet positions in the govemment. At 
least six gênerai secretaries (or just plain secretaries) hâve served in 
various cabinets. M.G.M. Marijnen, a former gênerai secretary of the 
Catholic central fédération for industry and big business, even held the 
prime ministership from 1963 to 1965.29 However, not too much im-
portance should be attributed to this phenomenon as a means by which 
employers directly influence govemment policy. Employers hâve never 
lacked perfectly adéquate channeîs of communication through which to 
make their views known to cabinet, Parliament, and the high ranks of 
the civil service. Family ties, seats in Parliament, membership on party 
executives, and contributions to the campaign funds of the parties hâve 
throughout modem history ensured at least the government's close 
attention, though not necessarily its acquiescence, to the spécial needs 
(27) The employment figures are taken from récent annual reports of the three 
fédérations. 
(28) One well informed student of industrial relations has expressed a skeptical judgment on the quality of staff members of employers associations by calling 
attention to the interesting fact that académie world recruits new members more 
often from among the staffs of labor organizations than from employers associations. 
He also believes that by comparison with other West European countries the 
apparatus of employers associations in the Netherlands is not well equipped. See 
J. H. BUITER, Partijen en straiegieën in het arbeidspolttieke spel (Rotterdam : 
Wyt en Zonen, 1966), p. 15. 
(29) For a listing of the others see F. BARUCH, Grote macht in klein land 
(Amsterdam : Pegasus, 1962), Vol. II, pp. 14-20. Ail except one held prior positions 
in the confessional central fédérations. 
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and wishes of business.30 Cabinet positions for association officiais are 
the resuit more of a shortage of qualified and available candidates for 
ministerial posts than of a devious scheme to exercise employer pressure 
from inside the government apparatus. 
External and Internai Coordination 
Because of the relatively large number of employers organizations 
even at the elevated level of the so-called peak or roof associations, the 
problem of coordinating the several ideological viewpoints and économie 
interests is more complex than in most other countries. Among them-
selves, as we already noted, the central fédérations for agriculture, 
small business, and industry maintain for each of the three sectors a 
coordinating body, but that is not sufficient to ensure coordination 
across the sectors as well. The need for this additional coordination 
arose when the agricultural and small business organizations became 
incorporated into the centralized consultative and bargaining System, 
in other words in about 1940. 
Before World War II, the agricultural and small business organiza-
tions were of only marginal significance in industrial relations. As 
employers of labor, especially of labor in large aggregates, their mem-
bers were of small significance. Moreover, their myriads of stores and 
farms and service establishments employed far fewer unionized em-
ployées than worked in firms belonging to the industry and big business 
sector. Neither the unions nor the large employers were interested in 
complicating their relationships by introducing outsiders into the various 
industry councils and the top level coordinating bodies. But when the 
Netherlands came under German occupation in 1940, it became necessary 
to bring ail the central fédérations under one roof for administrative 
and control purposes. In subséquent underground discussions the 
employers associations and unions decided to create after the war a 
bipartite consultative institution at the very top level, the Foundation 
of Labor, in which ail employer groups and ail legitimate labor orga-
nizations were to be represented. Having gone this far, the employers 
realized at war's end when ail the old organizations re-emerged in their 
own separatist ways that they would need an overall body through 
which they could from time to time talk with one another before; talking 
(30) See J. T. DE JONG, C De ondernemer en de politiek », in Ondernemer en 
maatschappelijk bestel (The Hague : Verbond van Protestants-Christelijke Werks-
gevers, 1957), especially p. 52. 
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with the unions. They created, therefore, a « Governing Board for 
Labor Affairs » in which ail the central fédérations became members 
and which has served for the past twenty years as a relatively loose 
instrument for mutual employer consultation in social and labor po-
licies. 
Through this Board, but by no means through this Board alone, 
the fédérations of employers associations in agriculture and small busi-
ness hâve exercised a fair amount of influence on industrial relations. 
The employers, after ail, are engaged in a continuing quest for a united 
stand before government and labor — a quest made necessary by 
sharply diverging and conflicting économie interests in their own ranks, 
not even to mention their philosophie différences. The need for an 
internai compromise and the reluctance of employers to exhibit in public 
their internai divisions give the central fédérations for agriculture and 
small business some leverage over the national labor policies of em-
ployers as an institutional body, though not as much as they claim 
they should hâve. The économie power of the small fédérations surely 
does not measure up to that of the big fédérations, but their ability 
to withhold consent on issues which they deem important to the écono-
mie interests of their members, in other words their ability to create 
an embarrassing situation, furnishes them with a modicum of bargaining 
strength within the constellation of employers associations. 
- • S i . . 
Given their inhérent conservatism and économie vulnerability, their 
bargaining strength has frequently been used to oppose concessions to 
labor which the larger employers were probably prepared to make. 
Their complaints of inordinately high labor costs, shrinking profit 
margins, and rising threats to the very existence of an independent small 
business and farmer class hâve sometimes hardened the collective 
bargaining positions of employers associations as a group. To some 
extent, although ultimately not very much, the présence of the small 
business organizations and the farmers at the central bargaining table 
has limited the ability of the big employers to respond to the exigencies 
of the tight labor market. To some extent, one might say, their présence 
is also responsible for the « black wages » which individual employers 
frequently pay illegally in excess of nationally agreed and government 
approved maximum wage settlements. On the other hand, their pré-
sence has also on occasion served the large firms as a shield behind 
which they can maneuver to hold their concessions to a minimum. 
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Far from being oblivious to the internai dynamics on the employer 
side, the unions hâve long been ambivalent about the comprehensive 
line-up of employers arrayed against them. Comprehensive représen-
tation has, after ail, made centralized bargaining possible. It has also 
guaranteed the inclusion of ail économie sectors in the settlements, 
including the more weakly organized and less well paid employées in 
the lagging and declining sectors represented by agriculture and small 
business. On the other hand, the unions also know that the différences 
in ability-to-pay of the enormous range of employers represented by 
the various central fédérations has had a dépressive tendency on central 
wage bargains. In the Netherlands, as elsewhere, the logic of multi-
employer bargaining often tends to lead to settlements which just manage 
to avoid jeopardizing the survival of the weakest bargaining partners. 
Comprehensive employer représentation has also on occasion created 
procédural delays in negotiations caused by the much more time-con-
suming search for internai agreement on the employer than on the labor 
side while the unions impatiently mark time. 
There are indications that the unions hâve recently begun to stress 
the liabilities of comprehensive employer représentation. Such a deve-
lopment could well be the conséquence of a situation in which the 
unions find themselves under increasing rank-and-file pressure to 
demonstrate their marginal utility as bargaining agents. By publicly 
calling attention to the fact — as though they had freshly discovered 
it — that there are three times as many employer fédérations at the 
central bargaining table as there are trade union fédérations, the unions 
are signaling a certain amount of distress without going so far as to 
demand outright a réduction in the influence of the agricultural and 
small business fédérations.31 But it is highly doubtful that the big 
employers will accommodate the unions. Despite the bother of multi-
latéral coordination and despite the problems caused by the disparity 
in économie strength, the advantages of the présent System are on 
balance greater, even for the big employer groups, than a dilution of 
the System of comprehensive représentation. 
As the bargaining agents for employer interests in top-level collec-
tive negotiations, the central employers fédérations hâve a responsibility 
to ensure the adhérence of their affiliâtes to the central bargain, just 
as it is the responsibility of the individual trade and industry associations 
( 31 ) One of the most récent demands for simplification of employer représentation 
in central bargaining came from the président of the Catholic trade union fédéra-
tion. See S.E.R., Informatie- en Documentatiebulletin, June 23, 1966, p . 6. 
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to police their own backyards (and of the labor fédérations to look after 
their unions). Ideally, this kind of supervisory aotivity has the dual 
purpose of protecting employers on two fronts: one front against union 
efforts, or more often « wildcat » demands, to squeeze concessions from 
individual firms for the ultimate purpose of generalizing them, and a 
second front against straying employers who illegally pay less than the 
agreed bargain and thus might receive an unfair product market ad-
vantage, or who just as illegally pay more than the bargain and thus 
might receive an unfair labor market advantage. In the postwar period, 
employers associations hâve sometimes had to repair the fences torn 
down by militant and unofficial employée action committees, but just 
as often, if not more so, by employers transgressing into illégal high-
wage territory. 
In the absence of effective sanctions — the practice of heavily 
fining offending members having been almost universally abandoned 
after the war — the associations hâve had to rely on persuasion, 
éducation, and appeals to employer solidarity. They can, of course, 
always expel a flagrant violator, but that penalty has been extremely 
rarely employed, no doubt because its imposition hurts the association 
at least as much as the offender. Personal pressure on the heads of 
out-of-line companies, exercised either through the association or 
through its most eminent leaders, has been the preferred device to 
maintain discipline. In really critical situations, where individual com-
panies hâve been powerful enough to withstand ail conceivable sort of 
pressure and ostracism and determined enough to go their own undis-
ciplined way, the associations hâve had to confess impotence. It is 
precisely in thèse situations, and in many less critical ones also, that 
the real enforcer of association policies has been the government. Not 
that the associations act as « informers ». Very few could get away 
with that without losing a portion of their membership, although the 
construction industry may in this respect be an exception. Rather, the 
government under its légal and practical responsibility for the opération 
of the industrial relations System, including wage détermination, has 
certain powers through which récalcitrant employers may be brought 
in line. Thèse powers, when exercised through the judiciary, include 
such direct penalties as fines and, at least on paper, even jail sentences. 
Even more effective for préventive and correotive purposes are the 
government's indirect powers, such as fréquent labor inspections, close 
investigation of corporate or personal income taxes, and several others. 
Without benevolent government assistance, the central employer fede-
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rations could not hâve effectively exercised their disciplinary functions 
in the past twenty years. 
Although their rôle in the formation and administration of économie 
and social policy through bargaining and législation constitutes by far 
the weightiest activity of the central employers associations, they also 
engaged in a wide range of programs and services not directly related 
to the area of their central concern. In a gênerai sensé, it is their task 
to consolidate the position and to safeguard the image of employerdom 
as a social group, a task which they discharge through extensive public 
relations and information programs. Of equal if not greater importance 
is their educational and training activity through which they seek not 
only to raise the professional compétence of employers and management 
but also to introduce new concepts of management and new approaches 
to the solution of industrial relations problems. In this way the asso-
ciations do perform an important innovating and opinion-forming func-
tion whose bénéficiai impact on the attitudes and practices of especially 
the medium-sized firms should not be under-estimated.32 
Industry and Trade Associations 
The industry and trade associations belonging to the central em-
ployers fédérations correspond roughly to the individual national unions 
composing the trade union fédérations. The parallel does not quite fit 
because the diversity of associations affiliated with the central em-
ployers fédérations is much greater than that of the predominantly 
industrial unions affiliated with the labor fédérations, as is also their 
multiplicity. Furthermore, the authority of the central organizations 
over their constituent units on the labor side is, generally speaking, 
somewhat greater than the authority of the central organizations on 
the employer side. After ail, the hierarchy of unions developed histo-
rically as a militant movement for more or less radical reforms which 
needed cohésion, direction, and discipline in order to succeed. Em-
ployers, on the other hand, surrendered only grudgingly a slice of their 
independence to the associations and had little wish to let still more 
control escape from them by investing their associations and fédérations 
with a substantial degree of authority. In fact, had it not been for 
World War II and its aftermath, the central fédérations would in ail 
likelihood still be relatively weak éléments in the hierarchy of employers 
associations. 
( 32 ) In this connection see also D. HORRINGA, Ondernemingsbestuur in de moderne 
samenleving (Utrecht : Marka Boeken, 1966), pp. 122-123. 
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As history has developed, however, only a few industry associations 
are so large and operate in such important économie sectors that they 
can rival the central fédérations in authority and even exceed them in 
their scope of opérations. The two most prominent ones are the General 
Employers Fédération and the Fédération for the Metals and Electro-
technical Industry. 
The former, its sweeping title notwithstanding, is not a central 
fédération but rather a multi-industry association. It consists of about 
250 individual member firms and of some 30 trade and industry sub-
associations in a variety of « miscellaneous » industries, such as glass, 
ceramics, construction materials, flour milling, pharmaceuticals, chemi-
cals, and several others. Some of the most important companies in the 
Netherlands — for example, Shell Oil and Unilever — are among its 
members. It participâtes in about 200 contract negotiations every year 
involving well over 200,000 employées. Other services available to its 
member firms and member associations include légal advice, assistance 
in the establishment of company personnel departments, research on 
the personnel and labor relations problems of a particular company, 
expert counsel on time and motion study techniques, and guidance in 
the development or modification of job classification Systems, pièce rates, 
and the introduction of new work methods. With an annual budget 
in excess of FI. 2,000,000 ($550,000) it is able to operate a broader 
program of services than any other industry association. 
The other very large association, usually referred to as the F.M.E., 
covers the metals producing, metals fabricating, eleetrical, and electro-
nics industries. It represents the consolidation of five separate 
employers associations — some functional and some confessional — 
which decided in 1961, after having for several years already cooperated 
fairly closely in matters of common interest, to enter into a form of 
fédéral union that would préserve a portion of their autonomy and 
individual identity while at the same time offering the advantages of 
amalgamation.33 The scope of F.M.E. opérations covers not only labor 
(33) The five separate assocations are (1) the Vereniging voor Fabrieken op 
Ekktrotechnisch Gebied in Nederland (FOEGIN), a non-confessional association 
founded in 1918 for industriel and technical purposes ; (2) the Vereniging van 
Metaal Industrieën (V.M.I.), founded in 1916 as a non-confessional association for 
« économie » purposes ; ( 3 ) the Metaalbond, a non-confessional association dating 
back to 1919 and founded for the purpose of handling labor relations problems ; 
(4) the Katholieke Vereniging van Werl tgevers in de Metaalindustrie (K.V.W.M.), 
a Catholic all-around organization of employers established in 1918; and (5) the 
Vereniging van Protestants-Christelijke Metaaï-Industriëllen in Nederland (V.P.C.M.), 
a Protestant industrialists' organization set up as late as the fall of 1940, i.e. after 
ihe onset of the German occupation. 
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relations but also économie (price policy, taxes, etc.) and public relations 
matters. Some of the very largest producers in the country are among 
its members, including Philips and the large steel-producing company, 
Hoogovens.34 
Whether the F.M.E.'s pioneering attempt to combine under one 
roof several associations with divergent confessional-ideological views 
and with différent functions will set a précèdent for the consolidation 
of employers associations in other branches of industry is still highly 
questionable. The F.M.E.'s expérience has until now not been free of 
internai frictions, and the relationship of the individual parts to the 
superordinated fédération remains very much a matter of internai dis-
cussion. At issue is not only the always difficult problem of determin-
ing areas of jurisdiction and authority between a fédération and its 
associated parts, including the staff, but also the formation of a unified 
stance toward issues of labor and social policy which in this particular 
industry can reconcile the more settled views of the non-confessional 
employer groups with the more flexible attitudes of the confessional 
branches. 
Concluding Observations 
As long as the rôle of government in the economy and in the 
industrial relations System remains as crucial as it has been throughout 
most of the postwar period, the rôle of employers associations will 
necessarily remain an important one. To be sure, such giant companies 
as Philips, Shell, and Unilever with extensive international holdings and 
connections can always gain a hearing for their spécial problems without 
the intermediary of an employers association. But most employers, no 
matter how attached they are to the freedom to manage their own 
businesses in their own way, need associations to represent their 
collective interests vis-a-vis government and labor and, curious as it 
may seem, also against their own temptations to step out of line. At 
(34) In 1965 Hoogovens decided to take collective bargaining into its own hands 
rather than to continue under an association contract. The reasons for the décision 
stemmed, first of ail, from the fact that no other company in the Netherlands 
faces quite the same technical, économie, and social problems as Hoogovens does 
since it is, after ail, the only basic steel producer and, secondly, from a top 
management désire for greater independence from some of the relatively con-
servative companies in the association. Hoogovens has since concluded its own 
contract with the unions. The expectation that its departure might set in motion 
a trend toward more individual firm bargaining has, however, not materialized. 
For purposes other than collective bargaining, Hoogovens remains a member of 
the association. 
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the same time, the government would find it almost impossible to 
ascertain a common employer viewpoint in the absence of représentative 
and reasonably authoritative associations. 
In the first dozen postwar years the generally accepted need for a 
strong government rôle in the reconstruction of the economy went hand 
in hand with the government's willingness to engage in almost permanent 
consultation with organized industry and labor, thereby measurably 
strengthening the position of well-nigh ail organizations vis-a-vis their 
members, but especially the position of the central organizations. More 
recently, the ailments of an overheated economy with its inflationary 
pressures, tight labor markets, high demand levels, and balance of 
payments difficulties hâve led the central employers associations to 
argue vigorously against any tendency to decentralize the locus of 
decision-making to the industry or individual enterprise level for fear 
that wage and price levels would then burst the bounds of what they 
deem to be economically reasonable and defensible. 
While the government's willingness to make use of its extensive 
powers to control the economy has in the past exceeded that of most 
other démocratie industrialized countiïes, the conséquences of centraliz-
ation for industrial relations which flow from central économie controls 
hâve probably been carried as far as they can, short of an acute national 
emergency. The future trend in labor-management relations is likely 
to be toward more decentralization of responsibility and decision-making, 
partly as a long-delayed reaction to the centralizing trends of the past 
two décades and partly through récognition of the social advantages 
of more widely diffused decision-making powers. There are some 
indications already, although admittedly neither many nor particularly 
strong ones, that employers associations for certain industries would 
like to deal with their counterpart unions under conditions of fewer 
restraints from central direction, just as there are a few individual firms 
which hâve taken the initiative of engaging in separate collective bar-
gaining with labor organizations. 
As labor-management relations do become more decentralized, two 
important results for employers associations and for individual firms 
will ensue. Decentralization will, in the first place, act to redistribute 
the authority relations among associations by diminishing somewhat 
the importance of the central fédérations, with a corresponding gain for 
the industry associations. But unless carefully engineered, décentrai-
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ization could well hâve an initially disorganizing effect imtil a majority 
of the industry associations became more accustomed to applying their 
own resources and ingenuity to the solution of their spécifie problems 
rather than relying, as they often do now, on guidance and direction 
from « The Hague », the seat of government, where logically enough 
the central employers fédérations also hâve their headquarters. 
In the second place many individual companies will under greater 
decentralization feel the need to develop their own set of industrial 
relations policies and acquire a qualified staff to handle them. For 
perhaps ail too many years most employers hâve relied on their asso-
ciations — the central fédérations as well as the industry associations — 
to carry the burden of organized labor-management relations. With 
exceptions of course, they hâve devoted themselves as a rule only to 
employer-employée relations on an individual basis, and rather frequently 
in the spirit of trustées and benevolent guardians. More effort spent 
on the improvement of labor-management relations at the plant level 
should be salutary for employers as well as employées, for the former 
so as to help divest themselves ultimately of some of their deeply 
ingrained paternalistic attitudes and practices and for the latter so as 
to achieve, in the end, a greater measure of social and personal inde-
pendence at the workplace. 
LES EMPLOYEURS ET LES ASSOCIATIONS D'EMPLOYEURS DANS 
LE SYSTÈME DE RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES DES PAYS-BAS 
Dans les Pays-Bas, la sauvegarde des intérêts des employeurs concerne surtout 
les associations d'employeurs. L'importance de ces associations découle de plusieurs 
raisons ; les unes sont historiques, les autres sont contemporaines. 
Durant les deux premières décades du XXe siècle, années qui correspondent 
à la période de formation de la plupart des associations d'employeurs, les entreprises 
industrielles étaient généralement trop petites pour faire face aux pouvoirs gran-
dissants des unions. 
N'étant pas suffisamment équipées en personnel professionnel, pour faire face 
au problème, ces entreprises utilisèrent de plus en plus les services d'associations 
d'employeurs pour les orienter dans leurs rapports avec les unions et pour les aviser 
sur les politiques à établir en matière de personnel. L'influence des associations 
d'employeurs s'accentua davantage avec l'imposition de centrales économiques après 
la deuxième guerre mondiale et par suite de la centralisation de la négociation 
collective. 
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D'une façon générale ce sont maintenant les associations d'employeurs qui 
prennent charge de la négociation alors que les entreprises se préoccupent surtout 
de l'établissement de leurs politiques dans le domaine du personnel. 
Des fédérations centrales d'employeurs existent pour chacun des trois secteurs 
économiques : l'agriculture, la petite entreprise (surtout le commerce de détail) 
et l'industrie (la grande entreprise). 
La structure administrative interne des fédérations centrales d'employeurs se 
subdivise comme suit : un conseil des membres qui est virtuellement sans pouvoir, 
un comité général qui établit les politiques générales, un bureau exécutif qui est 
le centre du pouvoir et un secrétariat très influent. 
Dans chacun des trois secteurs économiques, les fédérations centrales ont créé 
des organismes qui ont pour but de coordonner les différents points de vue et les 
intérêts divergents. Il existe en plus un « Governing Board for Labor Affairs » 
auquel toutes les fédérations centrales sont affiliées. 
La centralisation des décisions a considérablement accru le pouvoir des orga-
nisations centrales, tant du côté des employeurs que de celui des unions. Il est 
difficile d'aller plus loin dans une société démocratique. On peut prévoir que dans 
un avenir rapproché la tendance ira vers une décentralisation et une diffusion des 
responsabilités. 
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